

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
**FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS**

<b>VICENTE FLORES,</b>	)	
	)	
<b>Petitioner/Defendant,</b>	)	
	)	<b>CIVIL NO. 08-cv-635-MJR</b>
<b>vs.</b>	)	
	)	<b>CRIMINAL NO. 07-cr-30065</b>
<b>UNITED STATES of AMERICA ,</b>	)	
	)	
<b>Respondent/Plaintiff.</b>	)	

**MEMORANDUM AND ORDER**

**REAGAN, District Judge:**

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence. This motion was filed by Petitioner, *pro se*, and the Government has not filed written responses to this motion. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.

Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts involving the manufacture and distribution of more than 500 grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 47 months imprisonment, 4 years supervised release, a fine of \$600, and a special assessment of \$200. No appeal was taken, but he subsequently filed the instant motion under § 2255. In his motion, he presents two arguments: (1) he is entitled to a two-level reduction as a deportable alien, and (2) he is denied equal protection due to his status as a deportable alien.

Petitioner entered into a plea agreement with the Government in an attempt to benefit himself. In exchange for the benefits he received, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal and to a collateral attack under Section 2255. Specifically, the plea agreement provides in relevant part:

The Defendant is aware that Title 18, Title 28, and other provisions of the United States Code afford every defendant limited rights to

contest a conviction and/or sentence. Acknowledging all this, and in exchange for the recommendations and concessions made by the Government in this plea agreement, the Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to contest any aspect of his conviction and sentence that could be contested under Title 18 or Title 28, or under any other provision of federal law, except that if the sentence imposed is in excess of the Sentencing Guidelines as determined by the Court (or any applicable statutory minimum, whichever is greater), the Defendant reserves the right to appeal the reasonableness of the sentence. The Defendant acknowledges that in the event such an appeal is taken, the Government reserves the right to fully and completely defend the sentence imposed, including any and all factual and legal findings supporting the sentence, even if the sentence imposed is more severe than that recommended by the Government. Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to seek a pardon, whether before or after his release from custody.

Plea agreement at ¶ III.2 (Doc. 85, criminal case).

The Seventh Circuit has held that “a waiver of a right to appeal contained within a guilty plea is enforceable,” provided the waiver is knowing and voluntary. *United States v. Feichtinger*, 105 F.3d 1188, 1190 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir.), *cert. denied*, 520 U.S. 1281 (1997); *United States v. Schmidt*, 47 F.3d 188, 190 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). *See also United States v. Wenger*, 58 F.3d 280, 281 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir.), *cert. denied*, 116 S.Ct. 349 (1995). A waiver will not be enforced, however, if the district judge relied on impermissible facts in sentencing (for example, the defendant’s race or gender) or if the judge sentenced the defendant in excess of the statutory maximum sentence for the offense committed. *Feichtinger*, 105 F.3d at 1190.

Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has found that a waiver of Section 2255 relief in a plea agreement is enforceable, and should be treated no differently than the waiver of a direct appeal. *Jones v. United States*, 167 F.3d 1142, 1145 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has specifically stated that both statutory and constitutional rights can be waived in a plea agreement. *Id.* at 1144; *United States v. Woolley*, 123 F.3d 627, 631-32 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997); *Feichtinger*, 105 F.3d

at 1190.

For the waiver to apply, however, Petitioner's sentence had to be within the maximum provided for in the statute of conviction and the applicable guideline range based upon his relevant conduct. The maximum penalty for manufacture and possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine is life imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). Based upon the conduct to which Petitioner admitted and others attributed to him, his applicable range of imprisonment was 70 to 87 months; with the benefit of a safety-valve reduction, Petitioner was sentenced to just 47 months. There is no basis in the record for avoiding this waiver, as the Court neither relied upon constitutionally impermissible factors in sentencing Petitioner nor sentenced him above the statutory maximum.

Because the waiver provisions of this plea agreement are enforceable, Petitioner has waived any right to bring this Section 2255. Accordingly, Petitioner's motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is **DENIED**, and this action is **DISMISSED** with prejudice.

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

**DATED this 17<sup>th</sup> day of December, 2008.**

**s/ Michael J. Reagan**  
**MICHAEL J. REAGAN**  
**United States District Judge**